We study the dynamic pricing problem faced by a monopolist who sells a storable good -a good that can be stored for later consumption. In this framework, the two major pricing mechanisms studied in the theoretic literature are the price-commitment and the threat (no-commitment) mechanisms. We analyse and compare these mechanisms in the setting where the good can be purchased in indivisible atomic quantities and where demand is time-dependent. First, we show that, given linear storage costs, the monopolist can compute an optimal price-commitment strategy in polynomial time. Moreover, under such a strategy, the consumers do not need to store units in order to anticipate price rises. Second we show that, under a threat mechanism rather than a pricecommitment mechanism, (i) prices can be lower, (ii) profits can be higher, and (iii) consumer surplus can be higher. This result is surprising, in that these three facts are in complete contrast to the case of a monopolist for divisible storable goods (Dudine et al., 2006) . Third, we quantify exactly how much more profitable a threat mechanism can be with respect to a price-commitment mechanism. Specifically, for a market with N consumers, a threat mechanism can produce a multiplicative factor of Ω(log N ) more profits than a price-commitment mechanism, and this bound is tight. Again, this result is slightly surprising. A special case of this model, is the durable good monopolist model of Bagnoli et al. (1989) . For a durable good monopolist, it was recently shown (Berbeglia et al., 2014) that the profits of the price-commitment and the threat mechanisms are always within an additive constant. Finally, we consider extensions to the case where inventory storage costs are concave.
Introduction
The study of the dynamic interaction between a monopolist and its consumers is a central topic in microeconomic theory. This interplay between a firm that dynamically sets up prices and consumers who anticipate future price reductions and/or future prices increases may sometimes lead to surprising equilibria. A classic and well studied dynamic interaction in bargaining theory occurs when the monopolist sells a durable good. 4 The key questions that arise include: What does the price path look like in an equilibrium? How profitable can the monopolist be, and what pricing mechanism should it use? Remarkably, Ronald Coase (1972) conjectured that a durable good monopolist who lacks commitment power cannot sell the good above the competitive price. The Coase conjecture was first proven by Gul et al. (1986) under an infinite time horizon model with non-atomic consumers. However, the conjecture relied upon an assumption that the time between periods approaches zero. Consequently, there have since been several proofs and disproofs of the conjecture for various economic models and time horizons; see, for example, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) , Stokey (1979) , Güth and Ritzberger (1998) , Bagnoli et al. (1989) , Von der Fehr and Kühn (1995) , and Berbeglia et al. (2014) .
A related setting in which there is a complex dynamic interaction between the monopolist and the consumers is when the good is storable -a storable good is a good that can be stored prior to consumption but it is not durable as it perishes upon consumption. Consequently, such a good can be stored for a long period but then loses all value after its first use. Prominent examples of storable goods include non-perishable grocery items and many natural commodities, for example, oil and natural gas. A less conspicuous example concerns digital goods. Digital goods are durable, but the technology often exists to make them perishable and, thus, convert them into storable goods. 5 As with durable good markets, the consumers in a storable good market can strategically time their purchases by taking into account current and expected future prices. In a storable good market, a consumer who observes a low price promotion sale, may increase her purchases not only to augment the current consumption level (the consumption effect) but also to stockpile the good for future consumption (the stockpiling effect). There is a large amount of evidence from empirical work showing that the stockpiling effect -also known as demand anticipation -is non-negligible in markets of storable goods. For example, Pesendorfer (2002) investigated supermarket price reductions for ketchup products in Springfield, Missouri. His main finding is that demand at low prices depends on past prices, which suggests the existence of a stockpiling effect. Similarly, Hendel and Nevo (2006) examined the price and demand dynamics of soft drinks, laundry detergents, and yogurt from nine supermarkets in the US. This analysis also showed that demand increases during price reductions are, in part, due the stockpiling effect. To capture the potential for stockpiling, the models of storable good markets assume that consumers have access to inventory space for an associated cost. 6 Dudine et al. (2006) studied a market where the monopolist sells a storable good to consumers with time-dependent demand over an arbitrary (but finite) number of time periods. They proved that, under some mild assumptions on consumer demand, if the monopolist uses a price-commitment mechanism then consumers will not stockpile any goods in equilibrium. They also showed that (i) prices are higher, (ii) profits are lower, and (iii) consumer surplus is lower if the monopolist uses a threat mechanism rather than a price-commitment mechanism. These results also suggest, unlike the classical results that proved the Coase conjecture in durable good settings, that monopoly power in storable good markets leads to several inefficiencies. The results of Dudine et al. (2006) have later been extended to other settings of a storable good market, namely a two-level vertically integrated monopoly (Nie, 2009a) , and a duopoly market model (Nie, 2009b) .
Our Results
A major assumption in the storable good market model of Dudine et al. (2006) is that the good is infinitesimally divisible. In addition, they assume that either there is a single consumer in the market that can always obtain some positive additional utility by consuming an additional fraction of the good (no matter how small that fraction is), or that there is a continuum of non-atomic buyers. In this paper we analyze the market of a monopolist selling storable goods in which either (1) there is a finite (possibly very large) number of buyers with a unitary demand per period or (2) there is a single buyer with an arbitrary demand per period but who can only obtain an utility from an integral number of items. Equivalently, the items are indivisible.
Our main contributions are as follows. We first characterize the optimal price-commitment strategy for the monopolist. We then show that it can be computed efficiently and that, under this price-commitment mechanism, the consumers will not stockpile the good. We next show that it is possible for (i) prices to be lower, (ii) monopoly profits to be higher and (iii) the consumer surplus to be higher, if the monopolist uses a threat mechanism rather than a price-commitment mechanism. These last three results are surprising, since they are in complete contrast to the case of a monopolist for divisible storable goods (Dudine et al., 2006) .
We then quantitatively compare the profitability of the price-commitment and threat mechanisms. Specifically, for a market with N consumers, a threat mechanism can generate Ω(log N ) times more profits than an optimal price-commitment mechanism, and this bound is tight. This is notable because previous monopoly models with a finite number of periods have the property that the threat mechanism cannot significantly outperform the price-commitment mechanism. In particular, we explain how our result contrasts with related results for a durable good monopolist. Finally, we examine the setting where inventory costs are concave. Interestingly, the consumers may now utilise storage when the monopolist uses a price-commitment mechanism.
The Model
Consider a monopolist facing consumers with demands for a consumable good over T time periods. The monopolist can produce units of the good at a unitary cost u and wishes to select prices {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T } to produce sale quantities {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T } that maximize profits, T t=1 p t ·q t . 7 For a perishable good with a short shelf-life, the corresponding optimization problem is straightforward as the firm can optimize in each time period independently. The problem, however, becomes more complex and interesting as the shelf-life grows. In particular, we examine the case of storable goods. Storability offers the consumers the opportunity to purchase the good before they actually wish to use it. Indeed, this option is desirable if the resultant price savings exceed storage costs. In accounting for this possibility, the monopolist's optimization problem now becomes non-separable.
Following the literature, we consider two cases: the single-buyer and the multi-buyer settings. In the former, all the demand comes from a single buyer whose (time-depedent) utility depends on the quantity of indivisible items consumed. In the latter, there is a finite number of consumers, each of them having a single (indivisible) unitary demand per period. In previous studies, the results obtained from these two settings are essentially identical. However, for an indivisible good, these two settings are not equivalent and can produce very different outcomes; see Sections 4 and 5.
Our interest lies in analysing and comparing two standard pricing mechanisms: the pricecommitment mechanism and the threat mechanism. In the price-commitment mechanism, the monopolist publicly announces in advance (that is, at time t = 0) a price schedule {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T } where p t is the per unit price in period t. The consumers can then make their purchasing and storage decisions based upon these prices. In the threat mechanism, the monopolist announces prices sequentially over time. Thus, the announced price p t = p(H, t) may depend not only on the current time period t, but also on past history H. Once the price at period p t is announced, the consumer (or consumers) must decide how many units to purchase and store without knowledge of future prices. For such a sequential game, the solutions we examine are pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). In particular, this restricts our attention to credible threat mechanisms.
The Single-Buyer Case.
We begin with case where the monopolist faces a unique buyer (monopsonist) for its good. Let the utility the buyer receives from consuming x units of the good at period t be given by the function U (x, t). Units are assumed to be indivisible, and therefore the domain of the utility function U (x, t) is N × [T ]. Assume the buyer faces a set of prices {p 1 . . . , p T } and that the storage cost is c ≥ 0 dollars per unit per time period. The consumer problem then consists of choosing the consumption quantities {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x T }, the number of units purchased per period {q 1 , . . . , q T }, and the storage levels {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S T }. These are chosen to maximize her total utility
The monopolist selects the prices {p 1 . . . , p T } in order to maximise the resulting profits T t=1 p t ·q t . As stated, for the price-commitment mechanism the prices are chosen in advance and for the threat mechanism the prices are chosen sequentially. In analyzing these two mechanisms we make the following standard assumptions. First we assume the buyer's utility function U (x, t) is non-decreasing in x. Second, we assume the marginal utility function is non-increasing in x. Specifically, let V (x, t) = U (x, t) − U (x − 1, t) represent the marginal utility of consuming x units of the good at period t. Then we have that V (x, t) is non-increasing in x. We also assume that there exists H ∈ N such that V (H, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T . No other restrictions are imposed on the consumer utilities. For notational purposes, we set V (0, t) = L for all t ∈ [T ] where L is a huge number.
The Multi-Buyer Case.
Next consider the set-up for the multi-buyer case. We now have a set of N consumers each seeking to maximize their own utility. Each consumer i has a demand of at most one unit per period and the value she obtains if she consumes the unit at period t is u i,t . A consumer i may, however, purchase multiple units q i,t of the indivisible good in any time period and store them for future consumption. Again, there is a storage cost of c per period and per unit stored. This time the monopolist chooses prices {p 1 , . . . , p T } to maximize T t=1 p t · q t , where q t = i q i,t is the total number of items sold in period t.
For the price-commitment mechanism, the consumers make their purchasing/storage decisions based upon the entire set of prices. For the threat mechanism, in each time period, the consumers decide (simultaneously) their purchasing/storage quantities for that period, given the current price. As we shall see, these decisions impose constraints on the monopolist's optimization problem. In particular, for the threat mechanism these constraints force solutions to correspond to pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE).
To simplify notation, let σ t : [N ] → [N ] denote the permutation that ranks the N consumers in decreasing values of their utilities in period t and let v i,t = u σ −1 (i),t for all i ∈ [N ] and all t ∈ [T ]. Again, we set v 0,t = L where L is a huge number.
An Example.
We now present a small example to illustrate the model and the concepts involved. Consider a two-period game with a per unit storage cost of c = 1 and with consumer valuations given in Table 1 . Here we assume that we are in the multi-buyer case with N = 2; however, it is straightforward to check that our analysis also applies if there is a single-buyer whose marginal utilities for each extra unit are described by the same table. We first calculate the optimal price-commitment strategy for this game. Let p 1 and p 2 denote an optimal sequence of prices under price commitment for periods 1 and 2 respectively. We claim that no consumer will ever buy a unit at period 1 and then store it for consumption in period 2. If so, we must have p 2 > p 1 + 1 as it is beneficial to buy early and pay the storage cost. But this cannot be optimal for the monopolist as it would then benefit from setting p 2 = p 1 + 1. It follows that the optimal choice for p 1 must either be p 1 = 17 in which case only consumer 1 buys, or be p 1 = 10 in which case both consumers buy. In the former case, the optimal choice for p 2 would be p 2 = 15 yielding a total profit of 17 · 1 + 15 · 1 = 32. In the latter case, the optimal period two price p 2 cannot be higher than 11, otherwise consumer 1 would use storage. Consequently, the optimal price is p 2 = 11, which yields the monopolist a profit of 10 · 2 + 11 · 1 = 31. Therefore the optimal price-commitment strategy yields a profit of 32 and consists of setting prices p 1 = 17 and p 2 = 15.
Next we calculate the optimal threat mechanism. Because prices and actions are chosen sequentially we can compute the optimal threat mechanism by reasoning backwards from the final time period. So consider time t = 2. In order to select p 2 the monopolist will base its decision on the set of items currently stored. If consumer 1 has not stored an item from period 1 to 2 then the monopolist will set p 2 = 15, regardless of the prior decisions made by consumer 2. Knowing this, consumer 1 will purchase two items in period 1 provided p 1 + c ≤ 15, that is p 1 ≤ 14. This observation leads to the following four possibilities. (i) The monopolist sets p 1 = 17. Consumer 1 then purchases one item in each time period giving a profit of 17 · 1 + 15 · 1 = 32. (ii) The monopolist sets p 1 = 14 and consumer 1 purchases two units. Given this, the monopolist then charges p 2 = 4 and consumer 2 buys one unit in the last period. This gives a profit of 14 · 2 + 4 · 1 = 32. (iii) The monopolist sets p 1 = 10 and consumer 1 purchases two units and consumer 2 purchases one unit. Again, the monopolist then charges p 2 = 4 and consumer 2 buys one unit in the last period. This gives a profit of 10 · 3 + 4 · 1 = 34. (iv) In order to induce consumer 2 to purchase two units in period 1 the monopolist will have to charge p 1 ≤ 3 giving profits of at most 3 · 4 = 12. Note that option (iii) is a credible threat strategy. If consumer 1 refuses to buy two units in period 1 her utility will fall as the price would then rise to p 2 = 15. If consumer 2 refuses to buy one unit in period 1 then his utility will be unchanged. Thus, the optimal threat mechanism gives total profits of 34.
We now point out some interesting observations. First, note that, in this example, the equilibrium under threat mechanism involves storage whereas the price-commitment solution does not. We prove in Section 3 that this observation is universal. Regardless of the number of time periods, the valuation functions, or whether the game is single-buyer or multi-buyer, there is an optimal price commitment strategy that induces no storage. Thus, in terms of storage costs, the price-commitment mechanism is more efficient that the threat mechanism. Second, note that, in this example, the prices under price-commitment are higher than under the threat mechanism in each period. Third, the monopolist profits are lower under the price-commitment (32) than threat (34). Finally, the consumer surplus (the total utility obtained by consumers minus money transfers to the monopolist and storage costs) is lower under the price-commitment (0) than with the threat mechanism (11). The last three observations are surprising as Dudine et al. (2006) prove that none of those three statements can be true if the monopolist is selling a divisible storable good.
Optimal Price Commitment Mechanisms
In this section we derive an efficient procedure to calculate an optimal sequence of prices {p 1 , . . . , p T } (price at period t is p t ) that the monopolist could announce to maximize its revenue under price commitment. Furthermore, the optimal price sequence is the same regardless of whether we are in the single-buyer or multi-buyer case.
We begin with the following simple observation that holds for the multi-buyer and the single buyer settings.
Observation 1 Let {p 1 , . . . , p T } be any sequence of pre-commitment prices. If sales at period t are positive then p t is finite and
This contradicts the rationality of the consumer (single-buyer case) or the consumers who buy at period t (multibuyer case), as she/they can increase their utility by bringing forward the period t purchases to period t ′ and then storing the good.
⊓ ⊔
The following theorem shows that under price-commitment there is no wasteful storage. This "storage-proof" property of the price-commitment mechanism extends the result of Dudine et al. (2006) to the case of indivisible demand. 8 Theorem 2. There always exists a revenue maximising price commitment strategy in which there is no storage. This pricing strategy is the same for the single-buyer and the multiple-buyer settings.
Proof. Take any optimal price commitment strategy {p 1 , . . . , p T } in which the consumer/consumers use the storage option. We show that there is another optimal price commitment strategy that requires less storage. The theorem will follow. Let t be the first time period where q t > x t . Thus a consumer stores at least one unit of the good between period t and period t + 1. We may assume in the case of a tie that the consumer(s) selects an option with the least storage. By the rationality of each consumer, we then have that p t+1 > p t + c. By Observation 1, we then have that q t+1 = 0. Now suppose the monopolist modifies her price commitment policy by setting p t+1 = p t + c. Observe first that consumption in periods 1 to t will not change. Second, in the single-buyer case the consumer now prefers to purchase q t − x t units in period t + 1 rather than buying them earlier and storing them. In the multi-buyer case there are q t − x t consumers who previously bought a unit to store at period t and now prefer to purchase it in period t + 1. Thirdly, the purchases made from period t + 2 are unaffected by this price change; if it is now preferable to buy additional units in period t + 1 then each consumer would have originally benefited by making such purchases in period t. This modified strategy pricing cannot decrease the monopolists profits (if c > 0 then profits strictly increase).
⊓ ⊔ Now recall that in the multiple-buyer setting, v i,t is the utility of the i th consumer (ranked in decreasing order of their utility values in time period t). In the single-buyer setting, in order to unify notation, we let v i,t = V (i, t) (that is the marginal utility of consuming x units of the good at period t) and let the value of H ∈ N such that V (H, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T be equal to N + 1.
Lemma 2 allows us to write the monopolist's problem as follows. The formulation is valid for the single-buyer model as well as for the multiple-buyer setting.
Here q t is a non-negative integer representing the number of items sold at time t. For the consumer to desire this amount, the price at time t must be at most the corresponding marginal utility -this gives the first constraint. The second constraint states that if there are sales in period t then the price p t cannot be more than the total cost of purchasing a good in an earlier period and storing it until time t. Recall that we set v 0,t = L. Thus, if q t = 0 we may set p t = L; this cannot decrease the objective function as it can only weaken the restrictions imposed by the second set of constraints.
The following theorem is crucial for the construction of the polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal sequence of pre-commitment prices.
Theorem 3. There exists optimal pre-commitment prices p 1 , . . . , p T such that for each t, we have p t = v j,s + (t − s) · c for some s ≤ t and some 0 ≤ j ≤ N .
Proof. Take an optimal sequence of pre-commitment prices (p 1 , . . . , p T ) that do not require storage. If these do not satisfy the requirements of the theorem then take smallest time t such that p t = v j,s + (t − s) · c for any s ≤ t and for any j ≤ N . Now, if q t = 0 then setp t = v 0,t = L. It is easy to verify that the new prices {p 1 , . . . ,p t , . . . , p T } induce the same behaviour by the consumer or consumers and, thus, produce the same revenue. Moreover, the period t now satisfies the requirements of the theorem for s = t and j = 0. So suppose q t ≥ 1. We now set
We claim (p 1 , . . . ,p t , . . . , p T ) is a more profitable sequence of pre-commitment prices. To do this we again desire that the consumer (or consumers) behaviour does not change. If so, the price increase at time t will result in additional revenue. First, the price increase at time t will not affect consumption by the consumer(s) in any period t ′ < t. Second the price increase at time t will not alter consumption in periods t ′′ > t; making additional purchases at time t and storing them for future consumption is even less desirable than before. It remains to consider sales in period t. Recall there were originally q t sales in period t. Because there was no storage, it must, by consumer rationality, be the case that v q t+1 ,t < p t ≤ v qt,t .
Thus, p t < v qt,t , otherwise p t does satisfy the requirements of the theorem. It follows that v qt,t was a feasible option when selectingp t . Hence,p t ≤ v qt,t . Thus the price of the item at time t is still at most the marginal value the q th t unit (in the multi-buyer case,p t is at most the utility at period t of the consumer with the q th t highest utility in that period). But does the price increase from p t top t now induce the consumer or consumers to now purchase early and store for consumption at time t? This is not the case. Since q t > 0, we know by Observation 1 that p t ≤ p s + (t − s) · c for all s < t. Since by assumption p t = v j,s + (t − s) · c for any s ≤ t and for any j ≤ N , we have that p t < p s + (t − s) · c. Now, by the minimality of t we have that p s = v j ′ ,r + (s − r) · c for some r ≤ s and 0 ≤ j ′ ≤ N . Hence
It then follows, by the definition ofp t , thatp t ≤ p s +(t−s)·c. Consequently, it is not beneficial for the consumer or consumers to use storage and {p 1 , . . . ,p t , . . . , p T } is a more profitable solution for the monopolist. Iterating the argument produces a sequence of pre-commitment prices that satisfy the requirements of the theorem for every period t.
The structure provided by Theorem 3 allows us to construct an optimal price-commitment strategy in polynomial time via a dynamic program. The key is that we search for prices of the form p t = v j,s + (t − s) · c, for some s ≤ t and some 0 ≤ j ≤ N . Intuitively, this means we are matching a price p t with a value v j,s . Of course, this correspondence has to satisfy numerous constraints in order to be rational and profit-maximizing.
To explain how to find the optimal correspondence, we begin with some definitions. For each demand utility v i,t we associate a 2D contour γ i,t to the demand of the ith item in period t. (Recall that demands are sorted by decreasing value in each period, that is, v i,t ≥ v i+1,t .) We then define a total ordering over all the contours. Specifically, we say γ i,t γ j,r if v i,t + c · (r − t) ≤ v j,r and t ≤ r. To motivate this, assume the consumer is debating whether to purchase and consume j items in period r or to purchase in period t < r and then store the goods until period r. The best choice is determined by the ordering of the contours γ i,t and γ j,r .
We denote by C t = {γ i,t : i ∈ [N ]} the set of contours associated with demands in period t. Further, we set C 0 to contain a dummy contour, C 0 = {γ * } where γ γ * for all γ ∈ T t=1 C t . We will view the selection of the dummy contour in time t as the assignment p t = L for some huge L.
Now suppose we select a contour γ j,s at time t. As described, this produces the price p t = v j,s + (t − s) · c. In addition, this choice constrains the price choices for all periods r > t. Specifically, such a price p r must correspond to a contour no higher than γ j,s . Hence, the choice of contours (excluding dummy contours) is non-increasing over time. To formalize this for the dynamic program we use the following notation.
is the feasible set of contours for period t, given that the lowest contour chosen so far is γ i,y . Given a contour γ i,s and a time period t ≥ s, we define p t (γ i,s ) = v i,s + c · (t − s). We then set q t (γ i,s ) = #{j ≥ 1 : v j,t ≥ p t (γ i,s )} to be the number of items in period t with value at least p t (γ i,s ). Note that if there is no storage then q t (γ i,s ) is exactly the number of sales in period t when prices are p t (γ i,s ). We are now ready to present a dynamic program that calculates the optimal sequence of pre-commitment prices in polynomial time.
Theorem 4. The dynamic program computes an optimal sequence of prices under price commitment.
Algorithm 1 Optimal price commitment mechanism
for each γi,s ∈ t−1 τ =0 Cτ do R(t, γi,s) ← max{qt(γj,r) · pt(γi,r) + R(t + 1, γj,r) : γj,r ∈ Ft(γi,s)} S(t, γi,s) ← arg maxγ j,r {qt(γj,r) · pt(γi,r) + R(t + 1, γj,r) : γj,r ∈ Ft(γi,s)} end for end for return {p1(S(1, γ * )), p2(S(2, S(1, γ * ))), . . .} Proof. We want to show that R(t, γ i,s ) computes the optimal revenue obtainable in period t to T , given that the maximum price we may use in period t is induced by the contour γ i,s . That is, the maximum price p t is at most v i,s + (t − s) · c. We prove this by backwards induction from the last period. For t = T , we have that R(t, γ i,s ) maximises the quantity times price given the upper bound on price implied by γ i,s , as desired. Now consider R(t, γ i,s ), for t < T . Again, by Theorem 3 there exists an optimal pricing strategy in which the price at period t is equal to p t (γ i,r ) for some γ i,r ∈ t τ =1 C τ . To maximise profits we wish to select a contour in C t ; however, the corresponding price must not be above γ i,s . Thus, the optimal choice, S(t, γ i,s ), must either be γ i,s itself or a lower contour in C t . The objective is to maximise revenue in period t plus revenues from periods t + 1 to T . The correctness of the procedure follows as the latter has been calculated inductively.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5. An optimal sequence (p 1 . . . , p T ) of pre-commitment prices can be computed in time O(T · D 2 ), where T is the number of periods and D is the total number of items in demand (D ≤ N · T ).
Proof. The outer loop covers T periods. The inner loop takes examines at most D counters (one for each demand item). The two variable assignments require O(D) operations. Together this takes time O(T · D 2 ). ⊓ ⊔
A Relationship between Price-Commitment Profits and Threat Profits
Recall, in the divisible storable good (Dudine et al., 2006) , monopoly profits under a pricecommitment mechanism are always higher than or equal to those obtained under a threat mechanism. We saw an example in Section 2.3 showing this need not be the case for an indivisible good. In this section, we quantify exactly how much more profits a threat mechanism can generate than a price-commitment mechanism for an indivisible good. Specifically, let Π T h (G) and Π Com (G) denote the storable good monopoly revenue in the game G under threat and pricecommitment respectively. Our main result is that, for the multi-buyer case with N (G) consumers, there exists an example for which Π T h (G) = Ω(log(N (G)) · Π Com (G)). Furthermore this result is tight, for any game G, we have Π T h (G) = O(log(N (G)) · Π Com (G)). Before presenting these results, we give a simple example to show that in the single-buyer case there are examples where the monopolist can obtain arbitrarily higher profits using a threat mechanism rather than a price-commitment mechanism.
The Single-Buyer Case.
Here is a single-buyer example where profits for the threat mechanism are arbitrarily higher than for the price-commitment mechanism Theorem 6. For any k ∈ N, there exists a single-buyer storable good monopoly game G such that Π T h (G) > k · Π Com (G).
Proof. We create a game G with T = 2 periods. The buyer receives zero utility from consumption in the first period. In the second period, the buyer has a marginal utility of 1 + ǫ for the first unit of consumption (for some small ǫ > 0), and a marginal utility of 1 i for the ith unit of consumption, for 2 ≤ i ≤ N . This is summarized in Table 2 . The storage costs are assumed to be negligible, that is, c = 0. 1 2 3 · · · i · · · N Marginal Utility in Period t = 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 Marginal Utility in Period t = 2 1+ǫ 1 2 1 3 · · · 1 i · · · 1 N Using a price-commitment strategy the maximum profit obtainable by the monopolist is clearly Π Com (G) = 1 + ǫ. On the other hand, the monopolist can do far better by using a threat mechanism. To see this, first consider what happens if the consumer refuses to buys any items in the first period. The price in the second period will be then be the static monopoly price of 1 + ǫ; the consumer surplus would then be zero. So suppose the monopolist announces a price of
As discussed, the consumer generates no surplus if she refuses to buy in period 1. What happens if the consumer buys one unit at price p 1 and stores it for consumption in period 2? Then, in the second period, if the consumer buys k < N additional items, her marginal utility for that final unit of consumption is 1 k+1 . Therefore, given that the consumer bought exactly one unit in period 1, the optimal price for the monopolist is p 2 = 1 N in the second period. Consumer surplus over the two periods is then
Hence the consumer is no worse off by purchasing one item in the first period at p 1 than if she waits and buys only in the second period. The consumer has negative utility if she purchases more than one unit in period one. Thus, we have an equilibrium where the consumer purchases exactly one unit in period one with monopoly profits of
Is it also the case that monopoly profits can be arbitrarily higher under threat mechanisms than under price-commitment mechanisms when there are a large number of consumers? We remark that the example used to prove Theorem 6 does not extend to the multi-buyer case. To see this, suppose we interpret Table 2 as a game with N buyers each with a unit demand. The optimal prices using a threat mechanism would then be p 1 = 1 + ǫ (one consumer buys) and p 2 = 1/N (and the remaining N − 1 consumers buy). But this only yields a total profit that is less than 2 · Π Com . Intuitively, the reason why higher profits cannot be extracted is because the N buyers do not cooperate. In contrast, in the single-buyer setting, the monopolist is able to exploit the fact that the buyer is willing to buy at a "loss" in period 1 in order to obtain a surplus in period 2. Nonetheless, we now show, via a far more complex example, that the monopolist in the multibuyer setting can generate a multiplicative factor log(N (G)) more profits by using a threat mechanism. This is interesting, and perhaps surprising, in light of the results of Berbeglia et al. (2014) who examined a model of a durable good monopoly problem with N atomic consumers and finite time horizon originally proposed by Bagnoli et al. (1989) . In that model, Berbeglia et al. (2014) proved that monopoly profits under a threat mechanism are always within an additive constant (and within at most a multiplicative factor of two) of profits under a price-commitment strategy. The model proposed by Bagnoli et al. (1989) corresponds to a special case of the storable good monopoly problem studied here. Specifically, to capture their model we simply assume each consumer obtains a positive utility only in the final period, that is, v i,t = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. 9 This additive constant bound does not extend to the more general storable goods monopoly problem studied in this paper. Again, as in the single-buyer case, the ratio between the profits under a threat mechanism over the profits under a price-commitment strategy can be unbounded.
Theorem 7. There exists an infinite sequence of games G 1 , G 2 , . . ., such that the number of consumers is strictly increasing and that
Proof. Take any integer N > 2. We create a game with T = N i=1 2 N −i = 2 N − 1 periods. In each period t ∈ [T ], there is exactly one consumer with positive utility for the item; that is, v 1,t > 0 and v i,t = 0, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and all 2 ≤ i ≤ N . Furthermore, each consumer has a positive utility for the good in only one period. Specifically, we partition the time periods into N blocks, {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B N }. Here block B k consists of 2 N −k consecutive time periods. Note that N k=1 |B k | = 2 N − 1 and so there are indeed T = 2 N − 1 time periods in total. It remains to assign, at each period t, a valuation to the only consumer who wishes to consume in that period. If consumer i is the unique buyer with positive utility in period t then we say that i is the consumer of period t, or that i belongs to period t. (Given a set S of time periods, we say that a consumer belongs to S if the consumer belongs to any period in S.) The consumer belonging to any period in block B k , for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , is given a valuation of v k = 2 k−1 . Again, we assume that storage costs are negligible, that is c = 0. Table 4 .2 summarizes this construction. 3 · · · s · · · N Time Length 2 N−1 2 N−2 2 N−3 · · · 2 N−s · · · 2 N−N = 1 Consumer Value 1 2 1 2 2 · · · 2 s−1 · · · 2 N−1 9 Essentially, we can view the all the consumers in the Bagnoli et al. (1989) model as only wishing to consume the durable good in the final period. In those circumstances, it does not matter whether the good is durable or simply storable.
Let's first calculate the monopolists profit, Π Com (G), under price commitment. To do this, we claim that there is an optimal price commitment strategy in which prices do not change over time. Let {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T } denote an optimal price commitment strategy. Consider the largest t such that p t < p t+1 . Because there are no storage costs no consumer in any period s with s > t would buy at price p t+1 . Thus, setting a price p ′ t+1 = p t at period t + 1 will not cause the monopolist's profits to decrease. On the other hand, take the largest t such that p t > p t+1 . If no consumer buys in period t then decreasing the price in period t down to p ′ t = p t+1 can only increase profits. If at least one consumer does buy in period t at price p t then that must be the consumer that belongs to period t; any other consumer will do better by waiting to purchase in period t + 1. This means that the consumer from period t has a valuation at least p t . By the construction of the game, this in turn implies that every consumer belonging to a period s, with s > t, also has a valuation at least p t . Therefore, even with a fixed price of p t between periods t + 1 to T all consumers in periods t + 1 to T would still buy the item. This increases monopoly profits. It follows that there is a fixed price strategy that yields optimal profits. Therefore, to compute Π Com (G) we can restrict attention to fixed price strategies. It is then easy to verify that the optimal fixed price is 1. Every consumer will then purchase the good giving the monopolist a profit of 1 in each time period, and thus of T = N −1 i=0 2 i = 2 N − 1 in total. Hence Π Com (G) = 2 N − 1.
Next consider threat mechanisms. We will show that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the monopolist extracts almost all the consumer surplus. This equilibrium is composed of the following pair of strategies. The strategy of the monopolist is to announce a price equal to the value of the highest consumer yet to buy. The strategy of each consumer is to buy the item in the earliest period t where the price is at most her valuation, provided the consumer belongs to a period s ≥ t. Following Bagnoli et al. (1989) , who studied a similar strategy pairing in a different setting, we call the monopolist's strategy pacman and the consumers strategies get-it-while-you-can.
To analyse this we denote by G i,k a subgame in which the remaining consumers belong to the set of blocks {B i , B i+1 , . . . , B k }. That is, the consumers belong to a subset S ⊆ k j=i B j . Without loss of generality, we may assume that S contains at least one consumer of the block B k and that the subgame begins at a period t associated with block B i . We wish to prove that, in any subgame G i,k , the pacman strategy is a best response to the consumer strategy get-itwhile-you-can. We proceed by induction on k − i. If k − i = 0 then all the remaining consumers have a fixed value. It follows immediately that the pacman strategy is a best response to get-itwhile-you-can. Suppose that there are two blocks, that is, k − i = 1. Let |B i |, respectively |B k |, denote the number of active consumers in block i, respectively k. Note that |B j | ≤ |B j | as the set S in the subgame G i,k need contain only a subset of the original collection of customers in block B j . Using the pacman strategy then yields profits at least:
Observe that in period 2, of the subgame G i,k , we may make only |B i | − 1 sales as one of the lower value consumers may only wish to purchase in the first period t of the subgame. The only other logical strategy against get-it-while-you-can is for the monopolist to announce a price of v i in the first period t. This would cause each consumer to buy in the first time period giving a profit of (|B k | + |B i |) · v i . But 2 · |B k | + |B i | − 1 ≥ |B k | + |B i |, and so the pacman strategy is at least as profitable as this.
Before proceeding with the inductive step, denote by τ P the number of periods required by the pacman strategy to sell to (almost) every active consumer in G i,k . Observe that τ P ≤ k −i+1 but that some consumers may not be able to buy the good. Specifically, the consumers (if any) that do not buy all belong to the first k − i time periods, that is from period t up to period t + k − i − 1. All those periods are associated with blocks B i and B i+1 , since the number of periods in these two blocks adds up to at least 1 + 2 k−i−1 , which is not less than k − i for all k ≥ 2. Now if the monopolist announces a first price of v α = 2 α−1 , for some α < k, then the active consumers of blocks B j with j ≥ α will buy due to the get-it-while-you-can strategy. Period t + 1 then begins a subgame with at least one fewer block in which, by induction, pacman is the best response. Let Π α (G i,k ) denote the monopolist revenue obtained by announcing a first period price of v α (α < k). We can now write necessary and sufficient conditions for the pacman strategy to provide a higher or equal revenue than any such deviation. Let τ α be the number of periods needed to sell to all the consumers (that buy) if the monopolist announces a first period price of v α and then follows the pacman strategy. Thus, τ α ≥ τ P − (k − α). The corresponding additional surplus generated by selling to potentially more consumers is at most
To see this, recall that these k − α consumers belong to blocks B i and B i+1 .
On the other hand, by setting an initial price of v α the monopolist cannot obtain full value from the consumers in the block B k . There is at least one such consumer, so this causes the monopolist to lose at least v k − v α . To prove that pacman is a best response, it then suffices to show that the potential gains of announcing a price v α do not compensate the losses. To show this, we have
It follows that we have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the monopolist achieves near perfect price discrimination. Every consumer except (possibly) the first N − 1 consumers buy the good at exactly their valuation. The revenue obtained is therefore
Recall that the number of consumers in this game is N (
The following lemma shows that Theorem 7 is tight.
Proof. Let Π F (G) denote the optimal profit that can be obtained by the monopolist in G by setting a fixed price along the game. Clearly, Π Com (G) ≥ Π F (G). Let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v l denote, in decreasing order, the set of all consumer valuations over all time periods. The threat (noncommitment) mechanism cannot extract more profit than a perfect price discrimination mechanism. Thus
Thus, it suffices to show the following inequality:
where H n = n i=1 1 i . To do this, set j * = arg max j {j · v j : j ∈ [l]}. Thus, a monopolist that announces a static price of v j * would obtain a profit of j * · v j * = Π F (G). Without loss of generality, scale the consumer valuations such that j * · v j * = 1. We then have that, for all i ∈ [l], i · v i ≤ 1. Hence, v i ≤ 1 i . Inequality (1) then follows. ⊓ ⊔
To conclude this section, let's briefly discuss an important practical implication of these results. To our knowledge, all previous monopoly models with a finite number of periods have the property that the threat mechanism cannot significantly outperform the price-commitment mechanism. Since price-commitment strategies are typically easy to implement and popular with consumers, this means there is little practical benefit for a monopolist to explore the use of more complex threat mechanisms. Our results, however, provide a setting in which it may indeed be beneficial for the monopolist to explore such options.
Concave Storage Costs
We now examine the storable good monopoly problem in the more general setting of concave storage costs. Here the marginal cost of storage is non-decreasing function in quantity. Let C : N → R ≥0 be an arbitrary concave function such that C(q) denotes the cost of storing q units of the good for one period. (Here C(0) = 0.) Because linear costs are a special case of concave costs, the example in Theorem 7 shows the threat mechanism can produce an Ω(log N ) factor more profits than the optimal price-commitment mechanism in the case of concave costs. Furthermore, it can be seen that the O(log N ) upper bound of Lemma 1 also applies in the case of concave storage cost. We now examine the question of whether storage occurs under pricecommitment mechanisms. The answer differs for the single-buyer and multi-buyer settings.
The Single-Buyer Case.
We extend Theorem 2 from linear to concave storage costs in the single-buyer setting. Specifically, we show that there exists an optimal price-commitment strategy under which no storage occurs.
Theorem 8. In the single-buyer setting where storage costs are concave, there always exists a revenue maximising price commitment strategy that induces no storage.
Proof. Let D 1 denote any optimal price-commitment strategy for the monopolist, i.e the sequence of T prices, and let D 2 denote the buyer best response to D 1 , i.e. an optimal sequence of the number of items bought in each time period. Let the storage levels under D 2 be S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S T −1 , where S t denotes the number of units stored from period t to period t + 1 for all t ∈ [T − 1]. Let Q(D 2 ) = T −1 t=1 S t be the total amount of storage. Without loss of generality, we assume that given two purchasing schedules that yield the same utility the consumer picks the one with the lowest total storage. Note that the total storage cost incurred by the consumer is T −1 t=1 C(S t ). Let ∆C(q) = C(q + 1) − C(q). Thus, ∆C(q) represents the additional cost of storing one extra unit, given that x − 1 items are already stored. To conduct our analysis, we assign the storage costs incurred over the units as follows. We order the items in increasing order of purchase time; we arbitrarily order any units purchased in the same period. We now assume that units are consumed in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion; given a choice, the buyer consumes the unit purchased earliest. Observe that the storage cost at period t is
As we have an ordering on the items, we may assign to the ℓth of these S t units the storage cost ∆C(ℓ − 1).
Assume that Q(D 2 ) > 0. Take an interval I consisting of the periods {i, i + 1, . . . , i + k = τ }, such that S i = S τ = 0 and S t > 0 for all i < t < τ . By adding a dummy time period 0 with S 0 = 0, such an interval must exist as S T = 0. Next, let α denote the last period in the I \ {τ } at which the consumer bought an item. Thus q α > 0 and q t = 0 for all α < t < τ .
Because S τ −1 > 0 and S τ = 0 we have that consumption x τ at time τ is positive and strictly exceeds the number of items q τ purchased in that period. Moreover, we claim that every item consumed at period τ was bought in period α. Suppose not. Then by the FIFO policy every item purchased at time α is consumed in period τ , and at least one item purchased in period β is consumed in period τ , where β < α is the last period before α at which there was a purchase. Instead of purchasing that item at time β for consumption at time τ , the consumer could have purchased it at time α. By viewing this as the last of the resultant S α + 1 items stored at time α, we see that this does not affect the storage cost of any other item bought in any time period. Thus, by consumer rationality, the price paid at time β plus the storage cost for the item over the interval [β, α] must be less than the price announced at period α. Specifically p β + ∆C(S β − 1) + ∆C(S β+1 − 1) + . . . + ∆C(S α−1 − 1) < p α But then, by concavity of the storage costs, it is better for the consumer to purchase all of the items currently bought in period α, in period β instead. Thus, as claimed, every item consumed in period τ was bought in period α. Now suppose the monopolist modifies her price commitment strategy by changing the price at period τ to
Call the resulting price-commitment strategy for the monopolist D ′ 1 . Faced now with D ′ 1 , we claim the consumer utility cannot decrease if she purchases as under D 1 except that she buys S τ −1 items less in period α and S τ −1 items more in period τ . Under S, the price and storage costs associated with the last item bought at period α is
But this is exactly the price p ′ τ . By FIFO and the assignment rule for storage costs, postponing the purchase of that item until time τ will not alter the storage costs assigned to any other item (note that storage quantities after period τ remain unchanged). Thus the consumer is indifferent to postponing the purchase of the item until time τ when the monopolist uses D ′ 1 . But by the concavity of the storage costs, a similar argument implies that the consumer may postpone the purchase of every item bought in period α (that is, S τ −1 ) until period τ without a reduction in utility under S ′ In addition, we claim that the consumer cannot obtain a higher utility using another strategy against the new prices. If so, an improvement was also possible against the old prices, a contradiction. To see this, recall that the only storage modification induced by the monopolist change of strategy from D 1 to D ′ 1 was a reduction in storage from period α to period τ of S τ −1 . By FIFO and the assignment rule for storage costs, this storage reduction can only contribute to an increase in the storage costs for a potential new item bought before period τ , and for items already bought before period τ the storage costs remain the same. On the other hand, assume that it is now beneficial to buy at period τ , for price p ′ τ , an addition item or items for consumption at time τ or later. But then, by concavity, it was also beneficial to do so under the old prices. Thus, the postponement strategy is optimal against the new prices.
To conclude, observe that the new prices yield a higher profit for the monopolist than the old prices as p ′ τ > p α . This contradicts the optimality of D 1 . Thus, there is an optimal solution without storage.
The Multi-Buyer Case.
Unlike in the single-buyer case, Theorem 2 cannot be extended to the more general setting of concave costs when there are multiple buyers.
Theorem 9. There are instances of the multi-buyer setting where storage costs are concave in which every revenue maximising price commitment strategy induces some storage.
Proof. We provide a simple example with T = 3 time periods. Let the storage cost function C : N → R ≥0 be defined as:
C(q) := 1.5 if q = 1 1.5 + ǫ if q = 2 Here ǫ is a tiny positive number. Now let there be N = n 1 + n 2 + 1 buyers where n 1 and n 2 are very large numbers. The first n 1 consumers receive an utility of 1 in the first period and zero in later periods. The second n 2 consumers receive no utility in the first two periods and an utility of 4 in the last period. Finally the last consumer obtains an utility of 2.75 in the second period, an utility of 3 in the third period and no utility in the first period.
One strategy for the monopolist is to set p 1 = 1, p 2 = ∞, p 3 = 4. In that case, n 1 consumers would buy and consume at t = 1, n 2 consumers would buy and consumer at t = 3, and the remaining consumer would buy at t = 1 two units incurring in a storage cost of 1.5+1.5+ǫ = 3+ǫ. This pricing strategy yields a profit for the monopolist of (n 1 + 2) · 1 + n 2 · 4. Observe that is almost optimal in the sense that all except one consumer pay their total valuation. Suppose there exists another pricing strategy (p ′ 1 , p ′ 2 , p ′ 3 ) that is at least as profitable as the one mentioned above, but that induces no storage. Since n 1 and n 2 are very large numbers, any such price commitment strategy requires that the first n 1 buyers pay a price of 1 and the n 2 consumers pay a price of 4. Thus p ′ 1 = 1 and p ′ 3 = 4. If the remaining consumer buys at period 1, she obtains an utility of 2.75 + 3 − 2 · 1 − (1.5 + ǫ) − 1.5 = 0.75 − ǫ. Thus in order for the consumer to buy at period 2 (and not use storage) at a price p ′ 2 her utility has to be at least equal to 0.75 − ǫ. If the consumer buys one unit at t = 2 we have that 2.75 − p ′ 2 ≥ 0.75 − ǫ. Therefore, p ′ 2 ≤ 2 + ǫ. On the other hand, if the consumer buys two units at t = 2 we have that 2.75 + 3 − 2 · p ′ 2 − 1.5 ≥ 0.75 − ǫ. This implies that p ′ 2 ≤ 1.875 + ǫ/2. Observe now than in any of these cases, p ′ 2 needs to be so low that the n 2 consumers would always prefer to buy at t = 2 and store rather than to buy at t = 3. As a result, we proved that in this game every optimal price commitment strategy induces some storage.
